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Abstract
We use distributionally-robust optimization for machine learning to
mitigate the effect of data poisoning attacks. We provide performance
guarantees for the trained model on the original data (not including the
poison records) by training the model for the worst-case distribution
on a neighbourhood around the empirical distribution (extracted from
the training dataset corrupted by a poisoning attack) defined using the
Wasserstein distance. We relax the distributionally-robust machine learn-
ing problem by finding an upper bound for the worst-case fitness based on
the empirical sampled-averaged fitness and the Lipschitz-constant of the
fitness function (on the data for given model parameters) as regularizer.
For regression models, we prove that this regularizer is equal to the dual
norm of the model parameters. We use the Wine Quality dataset, the
Boston Housing Market dataset, and the Adult dataset for demonstrating
the results of this paper.
1 Introduction
Data poisoning attacks refer to adversarial attacks on machine learning by
adding malicious entries to the training dataset in order to manipulate the
model [34]. The malicious data could be in the form of label modification or
flipping (i.e., changing the outputs in supervised machine learning), data inser-
tion attacks (i.e., adding a limited number of arbitrary data points), and data
modification attacks (i.e., modifying some features or labels for an arbitrary
subset of the data). These attacks have proved to be powerful in practice [4, 3].
Regularization has been shown to be effective in training machine learning
models that are robust against data poisoning attacks [11]. This is motivated by
that regularization can reduce the impact of contaminated data records during
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training. Regularization can make the models generalize better to data that
is not directly in the training dataset. This is however only made for support
vector machines. A general analysis of why regularization can be an effective
method for mitigating the effect of data poisoning attacks is missing from the
literature. This is investigated in this paper with the aid of distributionally-
robust machine learning.
In this paper, we show that, by using distributionally-robust optimization [12]
for machine learning, we can combat data poisoning attacks. We show that we
can guarantee the performance of a trained model on the original data (not in-
cluding the poison records) by training the model for the worst-case distribution
on a ball around the empirical distribution (extracted using the adversarially-
manipulated training data) defined using the Wasserstein distance. The Wasser-
stein distance can be seen as the optimal mass transportation plan between two
distributions [20]. We find an upper bound for the worst-case expected fitness
based on the empirical sampled-averaged fitness and the Lipschitz-constant of
the fitness function on the data for given model parameters. This allows us
to relax the distributionally-robust machine learning problem to optimizing the
empirical sampled-averaged fitness plus the Lipschitz constant as a regularizer.
For regression models, we prove that this regularizer is equal to the dual norm
of the model parameters. We use three different datasets, i.e., the Wine Quality
dataset [9], the Boston Housing Market dataset [18], and the Adult dataset [23]
for demonstrating the results of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related work on
poisoning attacks in adversarial machine learning in Section 2. Background in-
formation on the Wasserstein distance is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we
present the distributionally-robust machine learning problem using the Wasser-
stein distance and transform the distributionally-robust optimization problem
into a regularized machine learning problem. We discuss the results in the con-
text of linear and logistic regression in Section 5. Finally, we present some
numerical results in Section 6 and conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Machine learning under malicious noise has been investigated for a long time [33,
21, 7, 19, 31, 32]. The idea of sub-sampling was proposed in [21]. This approach
relies on taking several random sub-samples of the dataset and training machine
learning models on them. Then, we use the model with the smallest training
error. Sub-sampling is powerful when a sufficiently small fraction of the data is
malicious [34]. Approaches based on outlier removal are proposed in [22, 10, 2].
They rely on identifying and removing a small fraction of the data that is anoma-
lous (i.e., follows a different distribution than the rest). Another approach is
to use robust learning by trimmed optimization, which relies on minimizing the
empirical risk while pruning a fraction of the data with the largest error [26].
Finally, regularization has been used as a method for mitigating data poisoning
attacks when training support vector machines [11]. Although different in na-
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ture, regularization has been also shown to be useful for mitigating decision-time
(evasion) attacks [24, 25].
Despite the success of regularization in adversarial machine learning, a gen-
eral analysis of why it is an effective apparatus for mitigating data poisoning
attacks is still missing from the literature. In addition, although Wasserstein dis-
tance has been used in machine learning [15, 1, 5, 12], it has not been used for
designing distributionally-robust machine learning models against adversarial
data poisoning attacks.
An important aspect of our work is that we do not assume anything about
the adversary, e.g., its cost function or motivation, except that there exists a
bound on its ability in poisoning the training dataset, as opposed to studies
relying on game-theoretic methods for adversarial machine learning [13, 35, 27]
that need to model an adversary perfectly.
3 Wasserstein Distance
LetM(Ξ) denote the set of all probability distributions Q on Ξ ⊆ Rm such that
Eξ∼Q{‖ξ‖} <∞ for some norm ‖·‖ on Rm. When it is evident from the context,
we replace Eξ∼Q{·} with EQ{·}. The Wasserstein distance W :M(Ξ)×M(Ξ)→
R≥0 := {x ∈ R|x ≥ 0} is defined as
W(P1,P2) := inf
{∫
Ξ2
‖ξ1 − ξ2‖Π(dξ1, dξ2) :
Π is a joint disribution on ξ1 and ξ2
with marginals P1 and P2, respectively
}
,
for all P1,P2 ∈ M(Ξ) [20]. The decision variable Π can be interpreted as a
transportation plan for moving mass distribution described by P1 to mass distri-
bution described by P2. In this case, W(P1,P2) can be seen as the optimal mass
transportation plan. This metric is sometimes referred to as the Earth-Mover
distance. Note that W(P1,P2) = W(P2,P1). We can compute the Wasserstein
distance using an alternative approach due to [20] by
W(P1,P2) := sup
f∈L
{∫
Ξ
f(ξ)P1(dξ)−
∫
Ξ
f(ξ)P2(dξ)
}
,
where L denotes the set of all Lipschitz functions with Lipschitz constant upper
bounded by one, i.e., all functions f such that |f(ξ1)− f(ξ2)| ≤ ‖ξ1− ξ2‖ for all
ξ1, ξ2 ∈ Ξ. Now, we are ready to pose the problem of training machine learning
models under poisoning attacks using distributionally-robust optimization.
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4 Distributionally-Robust Machine Learning
Against Poisoning Attacks
Consider a supervised learning problem with dataset {(xi, yi)}
n
i=1, where xi ∈
Rpx denotes the inputs and yi ∈ R
py denotes the outputs. For instance, in image
classification, xi is a vector of pixels from an image (which could be compressed
by extracting important features from the image) and yi is the class to which that
image belongs (mapped to a set of integers). Our goal is to extract a machine
learning model M(·; θ) : Rpx → Rpy to describe the relationship between inputs
and outputs. This is often done by solving the stochastic program
J∗ := inf
θ∈Θ
EP{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}, (1)
where Θ is the set of feasible model parameters, ℓ : Rpy × Rpy → R is the
loss function, and P is the distribution of the inputs and outputs (x, y) of the
model. Since we do not know the distribution P, we rely on the training dataset
{(xi, yi)}
n
i=1 to solve the sample-averaged approximation problem in
Jˆ := inf
θ∈Θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(M(xi; θ), yi). (2)
Even if we knew P, we cannot solve (1) directly (in general) as integrating
the loss function for arbitrary distributions is a computationally complicated
task [17]. The approximation in (2) is the basis of machine learning literature.
When n is large enough, solving (2) is a good proxy for (1) if the training
dataset is clean. However, in practice, the dataset might be compromised due
to adversarial inputs.
We assume that the training dataset is composed of two types of correct and
malicious samples. The correct samples are independently and identically dis-
tributed according to probability density function P. The malicious samples are
inserted into the training dataset by an adversary with the hope manipulating
the trained model. These samples are independently and identically distributed
according to probability density function Q. When training the machine learn-
ing model, we do not know either of these probability distributions. We only
know that a sample is correct with probability 1 − β and malicious with prob-
ability β. That is, the ratio of the corrupted data entries is β. Hence, any
given record (xi, yi) in the training dataset are independently and identically
distributed according to D = (1 − β)P + βQ. We make the following standing
assumption regarding the distribution of the training data.
Assumption 1. There exists constant a > 1 such that ED{exp(‖ξ‖a)} <∞.
Assumption 1 implies that D, which is composed of P and Q, is a light-
tailed distribution. All probability distributions with compact (i.e., bounded
and closed) support meet this condition. This assumption is often implicit in the
machine learning literature as, for heavy-tailed distributions (i.e., distributions
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that do not meet Assumption 1), the sample average of the loss may not even
converge to the expected loss in general [6, 8] and, as a result, (2) might not be
a good proxy for (1).
Let us define the empirical probability distribution
D̂n :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(xi,yi),
where δξ is the Dirac distribution function with its mass concentrated at ξ, i.e.,∫
δξ(x)dx = 1 and δξ(x) = 0 for all x 6= ξ. Evidently,
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(M(xi; θ), yi) = E
D̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}, (3)
and, as a result, (2) can be rewritten as
Jˆ := inf
θ∈Θ
ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}. (4)
By distributionally-robust machine learning, we mean that we would like to
devise an algorithm for extracting a trained machine learning model θˆn ∈ Θ
such that
Dn{J∗ ≤ EP{ℓ(M(x; θˆn), y)} ≤ Jˆn} ≥ 1− β, (5)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is a significance parameter with respect to distribution Dn
and Jˆn is an upper bound that may depend on the training dataset (xi, yi)
n
i=1
and the trained model θˆn. Clearly, Jˆn and θˆn both depend on the choice of
significance parameter β ∈ (0, 1).
In this paper, we extract the trained model by solving the distributionally-
robust optimization problem in
Jˆn := inf
θ∈Θ
sup
G:W(G,D̂n)≤ρ
EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}, (6)
for some constant ρ > 0. Note that θˆn ∈ Θ is the minimizer of (6). This problem
formulation is motivated by that the distributions of the correct samples P is
within a small neighbourhood of the empirical probability distribution D̂n in the
sense of the the Wasserstein distance if n is large enough and β is relatively small.
Therefore, optimizing sup
G:W(G,D̂n)≤ρ
EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} can act as a surrogate
for optimizing EP{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}. This is proved in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. There exist constants c1, c2 > 0 such that
Dn{W(D̂n,P) ≤ ζ(γ) + βW(Q,P)} ≥ 1− γ,
where
ζ(γ) :=

(
log(c1/γ)
c2n
)1/max{p,2}
, n ≥
log(c1/γ)
c2
,(
log(c1/γ)
c2n
)1/a
, n <
log(c1/γ)
c2
,
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for all n ≥ 1, p = px + py 6= 2, and γ > 0.
Proof. Following [14] and [12], we know that Dn{W(D̂n,D) ≤ ζ(γ)} ≤ 1 − γ.
Now, note that
W(D,P) = W((1 − β)P+ βQ,P)
≤ (1− β)W(P,P) + βW(Q,P)
≤ βW(Q,P), (7)
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of the Wasserstein dis-
tance [28, Lemma 2.1] and the second inequality follows from that W(P,P) = 0.
The triangle inequality for the Wasserstein distance [29, p. 170] implies that
W(D̂n,P) ≤W(D̂n,D) +W(D,P), and, using the inequality in (7), W(D̂n,P) ≤
W(D̂n,D) + βW(Q,P). Therefore, W(D̂n,P) ≤ ζ(γ) + βW(D,P) if W(D̂n,D) ≤
ζ(γ), which implies that Dn{W(D̂n,P) ≤ ζ(γ) + βW(Q,P)} ≥ 1 − γ. This con-
cludes the proof.
Now, that we know that the distributions of the correct samples P is within
a small neighbourhood of the empirical probability distribution D̂n (defined by
the Wasserstein distance) with a high probability, the solution of (6) should
provide a bound for the expected loss function in the sense of (5). This is
proved in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Assume that ρ = ζ(β) + βW(Q,P) in (6). Then, (5) holds.
Proof. The proof follows from [12, Theorem 3.4].
We can solve (6) explicitly following the approach in [12]. However, in this
paper, we show that we can simplify the aforementioned distributionally-robust
optimization problem by finding an upper bound for the worst-case expected
fitness sup
G:W(G,D̂n)≤ρ
EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Assume that ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is L(θ)-Lipschitz continuous in (x, y) for
a fixed θ ∈ Θ. Then,
sup
G:W(G,D̂n)≤ρ
EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} ≤ ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} + L(θ)ρ.
Proof. First, note that
EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} =ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}
− ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}+ EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}
≤ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}
+ |EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} − ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)|.
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We have
|EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}−ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x,y
ℓ(M(x; θ), y)G(dx, dy)
−
∫
x′,y′
ℓ(M(x′; θ), y′)D̂n(dx
′, dy′)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x,y
ℓ(M(x; θ), y)
∫
x′,y′
Π(dx, dy, dx′, dy′)
−
∫
x′,y′
ℓ(M(x′; θ), y′)
∫
x,y
Π(dx, dy, dx′, dy′)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
x,y,x′,y′
(ℓ(M(x; θ), y) − ℓ(M(x′; θ), y′))
×Π(dx, dy, dx′, dy′)
∣∣∣∣∣,
where Π is a joint disribution on (x, y) and (x′, y′) with marginals G and D̂n,
respectively. Therefore,∣∣∣EG{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} − ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)}∣∣∣
≤
∫
x,y,x′,y′
|ℓ(M(x; θ), y)− ℓ(M(x′; θ), y′)|
×Π(dx, dy, dx′, dy′)
≤
∫
x,y,x′,y′
|ℓ(M(x; θ), y)− ℓ(M(x′; θ), y′)|
‖(x, y)− (x′, y′)‖
× ‖(x, y)− (x′, y′)‖Π(dx, dy, dx′, dy′)
≤L(θ)
∫
x,y,x′,y′
‖(x, y)− (x′, y′)‖Π(dx, dy, dx′, dy′)
≤L(θ)ρ.
This concludes the proof.
For continuously-differentiable ℓ(M(x; θ), y), we can compute the Lipschitz
constant based on the gradients. However, continuous differentiability is not re-
quired for Lipschitz continuity [30, p. 61]. We explore continuously-differentiable
loss functions in the next lemma.
Lemma 3. ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is L(θ)-Lipschitz continuous in (x, y) with
L(θ) := sup
(x,y)∈supp(D)
‖∇(x,y)ℓ(M(x; θ), y)‖∗.
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Proof. If ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is continuously differentiable in (x, y), the mean value
theorem [16] implies that, there exists (x′′, y′′) over the convex combination of
(x, y) and (x′, y′) such that
|ℓ(M(x; θ), y) − ℓ(M(x′; θ), y′)| ≤
∣∣∣∇(x,y)ℓ(M(x′′; θ), y′′)⊤((x, y)− (x′, y′))∣∣∣
≤ ‖∇(x,y)ℓ(M(x
′′; θ), y′′)‖∗‖(x, y)− (x
′, y′)‖,
where ‖ · ‖∗ is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖. Hence, we can show that ℓ(M(x; θ), y) is
L(θ)-Lipschitz continuous in (x, y).
Note that we can select any function of the model parameters L(θ) that is
larger than the norm of the gradient sup(x,y)∈supp(D) ‖∇(x,y)ℓ(M(x; θ), y)‖∗ in
Lemma 3 as the Lipschitz constant, and thus as the regularizer. The choice in
Lemma 3 is merely the tightest Lipschitz constant for continuously-differentiable
loss functions.
Now, we can define the regularized sample-averaged optimization problem
in
Jˆn := inf
θ∈Θ
[
ED̂n{ℓ(M(x; θ), y)} + ρL(θ)
]
. (8)
We can similarly define θˆn ∈ Θ as the minimizer of (8). This optimization
problem no longer involves taking a supremum over the probability density
function and is thus computationally much easier to solve in compassion to (6)
(as it does not require solving an infinite-dimensional optimization problem).
We can still prove a performance guarantee for the optimizer of (8) in the sense
of (5). This is done in the next theorem.
Theorem 2. Assume that ρ = ζ(β) + βW(Q,P) in (8). Then, (5) holds.
Proof. The proof is similar to [12, Theorem 3.4] with an extra step with the
aid of Lemma 2. By selecting ρ = ζ(β) + βW(Q,P), according to Lemma 1,
P belongs to a ball around D̂n with radius ρ with probability greater than or
equal to 1−β. Therefore, with probability of at least 1−β, EP{ℓ(M(x; θˆn), y)} ≤
sup
G:W(G,D̂n)≤ρ
EG{ℓ(M(x; θˆn), y)}. Further, Lemma 2 states that supG:W(G,D̂n)≤ρ
EG{ℓ(M(x; θˆn), y)} ≤ Jˆn. Therefore, with probability of at least 1− β, we have
EP{ℓ(M(x; θˆn), y)} ≤ Jˆn. This concludes the proof.
Although the results of this paper hold for any machine learning problem,
convex or non-convex, we simplify the regularizer for linear and logistic regres-
sion models for demonstration purposes. This is the topic of the next section.
5 Application to Regression
We start by investigating linear regression and then continue to logistic regres-
sion.
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5.1 Linear Regression
We start with linear regression. Without loss of generality, assume py = 1. If
py > 1, we can treat each output independently. In this case,
M(x; θ) = θ⊤
[
x
1
]
,
and the fitness function is
ℓ(M(x; θ), y) =
1
2
(M(x; θ) − y)2. (9)
We also assume that (x, y) belong to compact set X ×Y ⊆ Rpx ×R. Following
Lemma 3, we have
L(θ) = max
(x,y)∈X×Y
∣∣∣∣θ⊤ [x1
]
− y
∣∣∣∣ ‖Wθ‖∗ , (10)
where
W :=
[
Ipx 0px×1
01×px 0
]
.
The regularizer in (10) is the tightest that we can use in (8). However, it requires
solving an optimization problem for computing the regularizer which could lead
to the use of additional computational resources. We can further simplify this
Lipschitz constant by noting that
max
(x,y)∈X×Y
∣∣∣∣θ⊤ [x1
]
−y
∣∣∣∣ ≤ max(x,y)∈X×Y
∣∣∣∣θ⊤ [x1
]∣∣∣∣+ |y|
≤ max
(x,y)∈X×Y
‖θ‖∗(‖x‖+1)+|y|,
and
‖Wθ‖∗ ≤ ‖θ‖∗.
Therefor, we get a more conservative (i.e., larger) Lipschitz constant:
L(θ) = (X + 1)‖θ‖2∗ + Y ‖θ‖∗,
where X = maxx∈X ‖x‖ and Y = maxy∈Y |y|. Therefore, for linear regression,
the adversarially-robust optimization problem in (8) can be rewritten as
Jˆn := inf
θ∈Θ
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(M(xi; θ), yi) + ρ(X + 1)‖θ‖
2
∗ + ρY ‖θ‖∗
]
. (11)
An alternative to the quadratic loss function in (9) is
ℓ(M(x; θ), y) = |M(x; θ) − y|. (12)
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In this case, we get L(θ) = ‖θ‖∗ and the optimization problem in (8) can be
rewritten as
Jˆn := inf
θ∈Θ
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(M(xi; θ), yi) + ρ‖θ‖
2
∗
]
. (13)
Now, we move on to the logistic regression.
5.2 Logistic Regression
In this case, we have
M(x; θ) =
1
1 + exp(−[x⊤ 1]θ)
,
and the fitness function is
ℓ(M(x; θ), y) =− y log(M(x; θ))
− (1− y) log(1−M(x; θ)). (14)
Note the opposite sign with the log likelihood as here we minimize the expected
fitness. We have
∇yℓ(M(x; θ), y) =− log(M(x; θ)) − log(1−M(x; θ))
=− log
(
M(x; θ)
1−M(x; θ)
)
=− [x⊤ 1]θ,
and
∇xℓ(M(x; θ), y) =−
(
y −
1
1 + exp(−[x⊤ 1]θ)
)
Wθ.
Therefore, we get
L(θ) = (Y +X + 2)‖θ‖∗.
The robust optimization problem in (8) becomes
Jˆn := inf
θ∈Θ
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
ℓ(M(xi; θ), yi) + ρ(Y +X + 2)‖θ‖∗
]
. (15)
In the remainder of this paper, we demonstrate the results of this paper for
regression models discussed above.
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Figure 1: Test performance of the trained model for the Wine Quality dataset
when using (11) to mitigate the effect of data modification attacks versus the
percentage of the poisoned data β for various choices of regularization.
6 Numerical Example
6.1 Dataset Description
We use three different datasets to demonstrate the results of this paper. The
first dataset is the red Wine Quality dataset containing 1599 records of red
wine tests [9]. There are 11 inputs capturing physicochemical and sensory mea-
surements for the wine. The output is the quality scores ranging from zero to
ten. The second dataset is the Boston Housing Market dataset containing 506
records from Boston neighbourhood house prices [18]. The inputs are features,
such as per capita crime rate in the neighbourhood and average number of rooms.
The output is the median home prices in the neighbourhood. The final dataset
is the Adult dataset containing 48,842 records from the 1994 Census [23]. In
this dataset, there are 14 individual attributes, such as age, race, occupation,
and relationship status, as inputs and income level (i.e., above or below $50K
per annum) as output. We translate all categorical attributes and outputs to
integers.
6.2 Experiment Setup
We demonstrate the effect of data poisoning on regression. We train linear
regression models for the Wine Quality and the Boston Housing Market datasets
according to (11) and train logistic regression models for the Adult dataset
according to (15). We split each dataset into two equal halves: one for training
and the other for test. We consider two form of attacks: label flipping and data
11
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Figure 2: Test performance of the trained model for the Wine Quality dataset
when using (11) to mitigate the effect of label flipping attacks versus the per-
centage of the poisoned data β for various choices of regularization.
modification.
When using linear regression for the Wine Quality dataset, we use two at-
tacks. The first attack is the data modification by changing the features of β
percent of the dataset to a Gaussian variable with variance of 4. The second
attack is a label flipping the output for β percent of the dataset to 10. When
using linear regression for the Boston Housing Market dataset, we use the data
modification by changing the features of β percent of the dataset to a Gaussian
variable with variance of 100. Finally, when using logistic regression for the
Adult dataset, we perform label flipping attack by negating the output for β
percent of the dataset.
6.3 Experimental Results
We first consider the Wine Quality dataset. Figure 1 shows the test perfor-
mance of the trained model using (11) for the data modification attack versus
the percentage of the poisoned data β for various choices of regularization. In
this graph, c1 denotes the weight behind ‖θ‖
2
∗ and c2 denotes the weight behind
‖θ‖∗ in (11) . Here, we use the 2-norm as ‖ · ‖. Therefore, ‖ · ‖∗ is also equal to
the 2-norm. For large enough attack levels (i.e., large β), the test performance
for the regularized model is significantly better. However, this comes at the cost
of a lower performance when there is no poisoning attack. This is because we
are solving a distributionally-robust machine learning problem to mitigate the
effect of poisoning attacks (with the conservative-ness dictated by ρ which is
proportional to c1 and c2). The robust model can act more conservative if there
are no attacks as in those cases there was no need for robustness and regular-
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Figure 3: Test performance of the trained model for the Boston Housing Market
dataset when using (11) to mitigate the effect of data modification attacks versus
the percentage of the poisoned data β for various choices of regularization.
ization. Figure 2 shows the test performance of the trained model using (11)
for the label flipping attack versus the percentage of the poisoned data β for
various choices of regularization. The same trend can also be observed in this
case.
Now, we move to the Boston Housing Market dataset. Figure 3 shows the
test performance of the trained model using (11) for the data modification attack
versus the percentage of the poisoned data β for various choices of regularization.
The regularized models beat the non-regularized one in terms of performance
in the presence of poisoning attacks.
Finally, we consider the Adult dataset. Figure 4 illustrates the test perfor-
mance of the trained model when using the logistic regression training in (15) to
mitigate the effect of label flipping attacks versus the percentage of the poisoned
data β for various choices of regularization. The regularization here also offers
robustness against poisoning attacks.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We use distributionally-robust optimization for machine learning to mitigate the
effect of data poisoning attacks. We show that this problem can be cast as a
regularized machine learning problem. We provide performance guarantees for
the trained model on the correct data by training the model for the worst-case
distribution on a neighbourhood around the empirical distribution (extracted
from the training dataset corrupted by a poisoning attack) defined using the
Wasserstein distance. Future work can focus on validation of the results on
13
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
β
E
P
{
ℓ(
M
(x
;θ
),
y
)}
Figure 4: Test performance of the trained model for the Adult dataset when
using (15) to mitigate the effect of label flipping attacks versus the percentage
of the poisoned data β for various choices of regularization.
more general machine learning models, such as neural networks.
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